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Philosophers have not yet come to terms with the morality of immigration.  We have 
developed relatively sophisticated accounts of distributive justice, political equality, electoral 
politics, and the like; even where we do not agree, we at least have a strong sense of what it 
is about which we disagree – the debates and positions are well-defined and sharply 
delineated.  Immigration, in contrast, remains somewhat mysterious. There is, I think a good 
reason for this: the other debates discussed above assume a given set of political agents, and 
ask what political relationships ought to obtain between them. The topic of immigration, in 
contrast, requires us to abandon this assumption.  Questions of immigration ask us not what 
duties exist between parties to a community, but who shall be allowed to form a part of that 
community in the first place.  The fundamentally different nature of these questions has, I 
think, made progress in our analyses of immigration slow and difficult.  We have a long 
history of asking what we owe to one another through our political institutions; we have only 
now begun to develop the tools needed to determine who shall be a party to those institutions 
themselves. 
 
In this paper, I want to make a start towards these tools.  I understand this task as part of the 
wider project of examining the possibility of political philosophy applying to global 
institutions, rather than simply to those of domestic political justice.  I want to argue here in 
a negative way, by arguing against a conclusion many philosophers have found agreeable: 
that there exists a universal right to immigration.1  I have previously defended the 
conclusion that no such right exists.2  I want, here, to defend this conclusion in a new way, 
by dispelling some of the arguments given in favor of this purported right.  I will begin by 
defining the contours of the right in question; give a brief précis of an argument to the effect 
                                            
1 This right is most forcefully defended by Joseph Carens in “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open 
Borders,” Review of Politics 49 (1987) 251-73. 
2 See Michael Blake, ”Immigration,” in R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman, eds.,  Companion 
to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
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that no such right exists; and then proceed to address three arguments, which might be 
introduced to defend such a right’s existence. 
 
To begin with, then: we must define what is meant by a universal right to immigration.  I 
take such a right to imply that any individual who desires to emigrate her own sovereign 
political community and enter into another sovereign political community has the moral right 
to do so.  I emphasize the sovereign nature of the political community not because 
sovereignty has any intrinsic moral importance – it has, on my account, importance only as a 
way of defining a form of political relationship – but because no other form of jurisdictional 
alteration constitutes immigration; we do not usually think of someone moving from Toronto 
to Vancouver as engaging in immigration.  Two things are worth noting in this right, as I 
understand it.  The first is that it constrains the permissible actions of both the state 
emigrated from and the state immigrated into; states may refuse neither entry nor exit, on the 
right as understood here.  The second is that the right does not demand any particular 
showing on the part of the prospective immigrant.  There is nothing that a would-be resident 
of a political community must establish as part of her claim to acquire membership; the fact 
that she desires entry is enough to preclude the state from excluding her. 
 
The alternative to such a right, of course, would be a non-universal – or, as I shall say, 
qualified – right to immigration.  It is worth noting how many forms of such a qualified right 
might be defended.  Those who do not defend universal rights of immigration, after all, are 
not thereby compelled to defend the border practices of states as they exist today.  All that is 
necessary for the universal right to immigration to be defeated is that there be something 
other than mere desire that must be given in support of a claimed right to entry.  If there are 
any qualifications on the right to entry, then it no longer counts as universal in nature. 
 
I will defend the idea of a qualified, rather than universal, right to immigration.  I can only 
sketch my argument in the present context, but I believe a sketch will be sufficient to get the 
argument going.  Immigration, on my analysis, represents not simply a change in physical 
location; it represents a change in political relationship.  An individual who moves from one 
sovereign political community to another thereby acquires a relationship with another 
sovereign government, and therefore also a relationship with a new set of political citizens.  
Even if residency is distinguished from citizenship – as it often is in Western democracies – 
a new pattern of rights and duties is created upon entry into a new political community.  The 
state, for instance, acquires a duty to protect the persons and properties of all residents within 
the community – a duty it does not extend to all persons around the world.  The United 
States government, for instance, is obliged both legally and morally to protect individuals 
resident in America from crime and violence.  It is not so obligated to protect the rights of 
individuals abroad.  This is not to say that the United States government has no moral 
obligations to foreigners – it does, and it is their scope that is at issue in many current 
debates.  It is only to say that acquiring residency and membership in a community creates 
its own set of moral obligations.  A French citizen, resident in France, who is victimized by a 
French criminal, cannot seek redress in American courts.  The reason for this is simple: the 
political relationship giving rise to the right to seek redress in these courts is not found in this 
case.  Residency and citizenship create their own patterns of rights and obligations, and the 
universal right to immigration entails a universal right to acquire these rights and obligations. 
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Once understood in this way, I think the appeal of the universal right to immigration is 
significantly reduced.  The reason for this, I think, is that we understand that entry into a 
political relationship such as this is something that is not best understood as itself an inherent 
right.  There are, I think, many circumstances that would give rise to a legitimate demand to 
acquire such a relationship.  The most central of these, I think, would be the failure of the 
current state of residency to provide the goods that legitimate government coercive force.  
Failed states, oppressive states, states which fail to provide adequate basic needs – all of 
these, I think, fail to provide the sorts of political relationship we think appropriate for 
individual moral agents.  Under these circumstances, I suggest, the right of countries such as 
the United States to keep would-be immigrants out is severely restricted.3  Where a foreign 
government does not provide the political goods we think individuals deserve, other 
governments have an obligation to provide such goods themselves, through immigration and 
therefore through admission to a political relationship. 
 
All this, however, describes only a qualified right to immigration.  It may be weaker or 
stronger, depending upon how we are to understand the required goods needed to legitimize 
government coercion.  But something must be shown for a given state to have an obligation 
to let a would-be immigrant enter.  This means, in the end, that a reason has to be provided 
by the prospective immigrant; the fact of her desire is not enough.  This means, further, that 
not all those who seek admission to a given state have a moral right to entry.  The moral 
principles binding immigration policy will, I think, condemn current state policies as unduly 
harsh and insensitive to the needs of prospective immigrants; but admitting this is hardly the 
same as admitting a universal right to immigration.  Some individuals may legitimately be 
refused. 
 
To see this, we may imagine an individual who already has obtained those goods necessary 
to justify a government’s action – however those goods are to be understood.  Imagine a 
citizen of a wealthy democracy, whose society provides adequate protection for her civil 
liberties and her person.  She is not subject to caste oppression, nor does she suffer from any 
form of political exclusion.  Imagine, further, that she wants to leave this country and move 
to France.  Does France have an obligation to admit her?  I think it would be difficult to find 
any basis for asserting this obligation; she is seeking admission to a political relationship – to 
be protected by the laws of France, to join with other individuals in controlling the political 
future of France – and France would seem to have every right to refuse her admission to this 
relationship.  Those who are not receiving such goods in their own nations may have some 
rights to receive them from the French.  But the individual in question has no such basis for 
her demand; she simply wants to live in France.  We have, I think, no strong reason to 
                                            
3 This analysis, I should note, provides us with both a justification for and potential critical analysis of 
refugee law.  Status as refugee or asylee represents, under current international law, a right against 
return to certain sorts of social and political circumstances.  International law, however, reflects a 
contentious vision or what sorts of circumstances are those giving rise to this right; critical reflection 
might give us reason to think different sorts of justifying bases exist.  I am grateful to an anonymous 
referee for pressing me on this point. 
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imagine the French as morally obliged to admit her to membership.  They may accept, or 
refuse, as they see fit. 
 
The precise contours of this picture need to be worked out; it is still unclear how we are to 
understand what sorts of things are sufficient to justify a demand for immigrant status.  All 
we need to establish here, however, is that some showing is needed to justify the demand.  
Many individuals may have a right to immigration; so long as the picture painted here is 
accurate, however, the right is qualified, rather than universal. 
 
The picture described, moreover, can help refute some of the more common arguments given 
in favor of the right to immigration.  By emphasizing the fact that immigration is an 
alteration in political relationship, this image can help describe what has gone wrong in 
several key arguments.  I will describe three such arguments: the argument from 
arbitrariness; the argument from equivalence; and the argument from coercion. 
 
The argument from arbitrariness begins with the arbitrary nature of state borders.  States are 
not natural creations; their borders are the result of human activities, frequently violence and 
illegal activities.  Sovereignty is, indeed, often found against a backdrop of theft and 
imperialism.  How, then, can a given state keep individuals born on the other side of the 
border from acquiring membership, given that the line in question is arbitrary to begin with? 
 
This argument, I think, ignores the fact that what is created by arbitrary facts can nonetheless 
be morally relevant.  The borders of the state are the borders of its legal and political 
jurisdiction; individuals within that jurisdiction are jointly responsible for the administration 
of political justice.  This fact binds those individuals together into a group of people with a 
shared project; this shared relationship gives them unique obligations to one another.  One 
way of recognizing this is with reference to political rights such as voting rights; those 
individuals who are subject to the coercive legal control of a given society have a moral right 
to have some say in the formulation of those laws.  Those who are not so subject have no 
such equivalent right; I have, for instance, no moral right to vote in French elections, no 
matter how strongly I feel about what shape their laws ought to take.  Similar things may be 
said about immigration.  Those individuals born in France (say) have a right to continue to 
live in the political community of their birth; those who simply want to enter into it have no 
such equivalent right.  The shared relationship of political community creates unique forms 
of obligation – and this fact persists no matter how arbitrary the border is within which this 
community is created.  We have a shared obligation to overcome the legacy of imperialism 
and conquest; this obligation, however, should not make us believe that a universal right to 
immigration exists. 
 
A second form of argument adapts this notion of moral arbitrariness, but uses a more specific 
notion of equivalence.  We care about mobility domestically; a key political right is the right 
to move around within one’s own country.  Why, then, would we not care about it 
internationally?  If there are reasons to value such a right within the state’s borders, and if 
the state’s borders are arbitrary, could we not therefore infer that we have reason to value 
mobility internationally as well? 
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This argument, I think, falls prey to similar considerations as the argument above.  Mobility 
rights may be, I think, part of the package of rights legitimate states owe to their citizens; 
legitimate states do not presume the right to tell citizens which corners of the state are those 
in which they must live.  But this is because those citizens are already in a political 
relationship with their government, and that government cannot claim to justly govern them 
while restricting their internal mobility.  Just as the French government cannot call itself just 
while refusing to let the French vote, it cannot call itself justified while coercively resettling 
French citizens.  But neither of these rights scales from the domestic to the international 
case.  However much I may like France, I have no right to vote in French elections; and I 
have no universal right to move there.  We value internal mobility and voting rights as part 
of the package of justifications for political coercion.  We have no equivalent reason to 
extend these rights to individuals who are not part of the political community in question, but 
who merely seek to become so subject. 
 
The final argument we may consider is the argument from coercion.  This argument notes 
that borders have guards on them, and that these guards have guns; the borders of every 
wealthy state are defended with the use of deadly force.  If we care about the justification of 
political coercion to individuals subject to that coercion, why do we not care similarly about 
the violence we direct against non-nationals?  We have no moral right, the argument asserts, 
to use deadly force against harmless individuals seeking entry into our society; coercion 
must be justified, and no justification could be forthcoming for such violence against 
prospective immigrants. 
 
This argument, I think, has some plausibility; at the very least, it is true that the coercive 
force of border security stands in need of justification.  On the picture given here, I think, 
such justification may be obtained.  We need only recall that immigration, on the account 
given here, is an alteration in political relationship; it means the acquisition of a new set of 
rights and duties – including duties on the part of the government admitting the immigrant.  
Imagine, further, that the individual in question has no specific claim to admission to 
immigrant status.  May we use coercive force to keep this individual out?  It seems simple, I 
think, to say yes – within certain limits.  If individuals are seeking a good to which they have 
no moral right, then it is permissible to use certain sorts of force to exclude them.  Imagine, 
for instance, that I have a large house, with a rather nice television; my family and I are 
gathered in front of it.  You live next door, in a perfectly adequate house (however such 
things are to be defined) with a slightly smaller television.  You want to come over and join 
my family to watch television.  I could easily fit you into my extended family; the house is 
large enough that your presence wouldn’t really bother me all that much.  Am I obligated to 
admit you?  I do not see why; you are not making a claim of need, or asserting a right I have 
reason to respect.  You just want to join this somewhat arbitrary group of people gathered 
under my roof.  It would be very nice of me to admit you, but I am under no obligation to do 
so.  Whatever my obligations to my family members may be – and I take no position here 
about what they are – they do not extend to you.  In particular, you have no claim to be in my 
family simply because you want to.  Since you have no claim to entry, moreover, it seems 
legitimate for me to use some forms of coercive force to exclude you.  I do not think that this 
permission extends to all forms of force; there may be some forms of violence I am not 
permitted to use, although I will not explore this here.  I will say only that there does not 
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seem anything particularly wrong in justifying the use of coercive force in preventing people 
from obtaining relationships and benefits to which they are not entitled. 
 
This last example, however, should show us what is deceptive about these academic 
examples.  In our world, the goods at stake are not televisions; to adapt the hypothetical, we 
in the West live in a mansion, while our neighbors are living – and dying – in the street.  
What such individuals are owed, I think, is best understood as the absence of such 
circumstances; including, I think, the absence of repressive political institutions and certain 
forms of material deprivation.  If this is true, then what we owe such individuals might be 
conceived of as a conditional: either assistance in developing such institutions in the country 
of origin, or admission to such institutions through immigration.  I cannot say much with any 
great specificity as to how this picture would guide our moral deliberations regarding 
immigration.  This picture would, however, likely give rise to a significant demand for 
immigration rights for such impoverished individuals, and would mandate radical revision of 
citizenship and immigration law as it currently stands.  In this, the proponents of a universal 
right and I would agree.  Our only point of contention, then, is whether the right to 
immigration is qualified or universal; and this point of contention, while philosophically 
important, should not obscure our shared conviction that our present norms of immigration 
are grossly unjustified.  If what I have said here is right, then individuals have to make some 
sort of showing before they can be understood to have a right to emigrate; in a world as riven 
with injustice as our own, however, such a showing will not be difficult to make. 
 
